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FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 2008: 
PROTECTING AMERICANS BY 
MONITORING INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNICATIONS; IS IT REASONABLE? 
Jessica LoConte 
“Those who can give up an essential liberty to obtain a little 
temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.” 
– Benjamin Franklin, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of 
Benjamin Franklin 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 10, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments 
Acts of 2008 (FAA) into law.  Days later, from the Rose Garden 
at the White House, he stated that the new law “will allow our 
intelligence professionals to quickly and effectively monitor the 
communications of terrorists abroad, while respecting the 
liberties of Americans here at home.”1  If only it were that 
 
 1 Presidential Remarks on Signing the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
PUB. PAPERS 975 (July 14, 2008), available at http://www.presidential 
rhetoric.com/speeches/07.10.08.html. 
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simple, there would surely be less controversy surrounding the 
federal government’s current surveillance practices.  Un-
deniably, the government has a responsibility to prevent 
terrorist attacks, but the problem posed by FAA is that it 
allows for far greater governmental intrusion into the private 
communications of law-abiding Americans rather than 
effectively monitoring the communications among terrorists. 
Specifically, the Fourth Amendment has long guarded the 
right of every American to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures of their property by government officials.  This 
begs the question of whether the FAA provides reasonable 
means of guarding the safety of our Nation.  Depending on who 
is asked, the answer to the question will be strikingly different.  
Former President Bush justified the new expansive sur-
veillance program by delivering a dire warning to the American 
people, stating that just because “the terrorists have failed to 
strike our shores again [since 9/11,] [it] does not mean that our 
enemies have given up.”2  Moreover, Bush “vowed to do 
everything in [his] power to prevent another attack on our 
Nation.”3  Because President Barack Obama signed the FAA 
while he was a Senator, one can assume that he also believes 
the current surveillance program provides reasonable means to 
ensure the safety of the American people.4  Accordingly, the 
United States’ current surveillance practices under the FAA 
are likely to remain in effect until 2012.5 
On the other hand, many Americans believe that this 
legislation is too intrusive, even if it was enacted in the name 
of national security.  Senator Russ Feingold remarked, before 
the passage of the FAA, that the Act authorizes “the 
government to collect all communications between the U.S. and 
the rest of the world.”6  This could ultimately “mean millions 
upon millions of communications between innocent Americans 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. 
 4 Nat Hentoff, Op-Ed., The Fourth Amendment Discarded, WASH. TIMES, 
Jan. 26, 2009, at A19. 
 5 The Act has a sunset provision. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 403(b)(1), 122 Stat. 
2436 (2008). 
 6 Press Release, Congressional Press Releases, Remarks of U.S. Senator 
Russ Feingold in Opposition to the FISA Amendments Act (July 9, 2008). 
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and their friends, families, or business associates overseas 
could legally be collected.  Parents calling their kids studying 
abroad, emails to friends serving in Iraq – all of these commun-
ications could be collected, with absolutely no suspicion of any 
wrongdoing.”7  Senator Feingold is not alone in his opposition 
to the current surveillance program—many civil libertarians 
find the FAA incompatible with a free society.  In response, the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) filed a lawsuit in the 
Southern District of New York on July 10, 2008, just hours 
after the FAA went into effect.  The lawsuit, Amnesty v. 
McConnell,8 challenges the constitutionality of section 702 of 
the FAA, and asks the court to issue a permanent injunction 
that would prevent the federal government from engaging in 
its current international surveillance practices.9 
This note analyzes the FAA in light of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and international privacy standards adopted by 
other nations.  The note argues that surveillance, conducted in 
the manner authorized under the FAA, does not comport with 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
because the government can intercept potentially all inter-
national communications without any requirement that sur-
veillance is targeted at individuals suspected of wrongdoing.  
The Supreme Court has balanced individual privacy rights 
with the government’s need to protect the public numerous 
times, and never has the Court upheld a measure that invaded 
the privacy of so many law-abiding persons who had no 
connection to illegal conduct.  Such dragnet surveillance 
techniques are not only fundamentally un-American, but are 
also in sharp contrast to how other countries have decided to 
strike the balance between individual privacy and national 
security. 
Part I provides a background on section 702 of the FAA 
and highlights the controversy surrounding the Act by focusing 
on Amnesty v. McConnell.10  Part II provides a very brief 
 7 Id. 
 8 No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available at http://www. 
aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/faa_complaint_20080710.pdf. 
 9 Complaint §§ 108-10, at 42, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008). 
 10 Id. 
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summary of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as interpreted 
by the Supreme Court, and its application in the national 
security context followed by an analysis of the FAA’s 
constitutionality, in light of Supreme Court decisions.  Part III 
discusses international standards relating to government 
surveillance practices with a detailed discussion of the latest 
decision issued by the European Court of Human Rights in the 
case of Liberty v. United Kingdom.  This section is developed 
through an analysis of the FAA pursuant to the international 
standards set out in Liberty.  Part IV proposes that while 
national security is an important government objective, it is 
also imperative to protect the freedom of U.S persons to 
communicate privately with non U.S. citizens located abroad.  
The current surveillance program under the FAA not only 
poses serious constitutional questions, but it is also 
incompatible with current international practice. 
I. SECTION 702 OF THE FAA AND AMNESTY ET AL. V. 
MCCONNELL 
A.  Background on Section 702 of the FAA 
Section 702 of the FAA grants authority to the Attorney 
General of the United States and the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) to jointly authorize surveillance of any 
individual reasonably believed to be located outside the borders 
of the United States, so long as that person is not a United 
States person,11 in order to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.12  Federal government officials do not attempt to 
circumvent the restriction on targeting only non-U.S. persons 
who are located outside the United States’ borders because 
section 702 prevents the government from intentionally 
 11 A “United States person” is defined as “a citizen of the United States, 
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in Section 
1101(a)(20) of Title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of 
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in 
the United States, but does not include a corporation or an association which 
is a foreign power, as defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.  50 
U.S.C. § 1801(i)(2008). 
 12 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(a). 
  
2010] MONITORING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 5 
 
targeting a person located outside the United States if the 
primary purpose of such surveillance is to obtain information 
about a person located within the United States.13  It is also 
important to remember that the FAA only authorizes the 
surveillance of foreign nationals who are located outside of the 
United States’ borders.  Pursuant to section 702, the 
government cannot intentionally target a United States person 
no matter where they are located.14 
In order to conduct surveillance, the Attorney General and 
the DNI must provide to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court15 a written certification attesting that: 
 
(1) Targeting limitations have been followed;16 
(2) There are procedures in place that have been approved by 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that are reasonably 
designed to “(I) ensure that an acquisition . . . is limited to 
targeting persons reasonably believed to be located outside the 
United States; and (II) prevent the intentional acquisition of 
any communication as to which the sender and all intended 
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located 
in the United States;”17 
(3) Minimization procedures will be used “to minimize the 
acquisition and retention, and prohibit the dissemination, of 
nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting 
United States persons;”18 
(4) “A significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign 
 13 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(b)(2). 
 14 Id. § 702(b)(3). 
 15 “The FISC consists of seven United States district court judges 
designated by the Chief Justice who meet in secret and are empowered ‘to 
hear applications for and grant orders approving electronic surveillance and 
physical searches anywhere within the United States under the procedures 
set forth’ in FISA.  Similarly, FISA authorizes [sic] a three-judge appellate 
panel, designated by the Chief Justice.  This special Court of Appeals consists 
of three district or court of appeals judges who hear appeals by the 
government when its applications are denied.  From this panel decision, the 
government may appeal to the Supreme Court.” William C. Banks & M.E. 
Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U.L. 
REV. 1, 81-82 (2000). 
 16 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(g)(2)(A)(vii). 
 17 Id. § 702(g)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II). 
 18 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2008). 
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intelligence information;”19 and 
(5) The procedures used are consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.20 
If the FISC finds that the above requirements are met, then it 
will issue a warrant.21 
Note that in order to obtain a warrant from the FISA 
court, it is not necessary for the Attorney General or the DNI to 
specify who the target of surveillance will be.  In fact, the 
statute specifically states that any “certification made under 
this subsection [section 702] is not required to identify the 
specific facilities, places, premises or property at which an 
acquisition . . . will be directed or conducted.”22  Nor does the 
statute state that the government must have a reasonable 
belief that the targets of surveillance have a connection to 
criminal or terrorist activities.  Although section 702 requires 
the government to adopt minimization procedures, the FISC is 
not provided with any details regarding the specific 
minimization procedures to be implemented, which limits the 
court’s review of the ways in which intelligence agencies will 
use the intercepted intelligence data in the future. 
Another provision that causes concern is section 
702(g)(1)(B) of the FAA, which provides a temporary exception 
to the warrant requirement: surveillance may begin under the 
authority of the Attorney General and DNI without court 
authorization if “time does not permit the submission of a 
certification.”23  However, certification must be made to the 
Court no later than seven days after surveillance has 
commenced.24  Lastly, section 702(i)(4)(B) allows the 
government to continue the surveillance practices, that the 
FISC found to be unlawful, while awaiting a decision from the 
Court of Review.25 
 
 19 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(g)(2)(A)(v). 
 20 Id. § 702(g)(2)(A)(iv). 
 21 Id. § 702(i)(3)(A). 
 22 Id. § 702(g)(4). 
 23 Id. § 702(g)(1)(B). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 702(i)(4)(B). 
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B. Amnesty v. McConnell: A Case About the Constitutionality 
of Section 702 of the FAA 
1) The Facts and Procedural Posture of Amnesty v. McConnell 
Just hours after the FAA became law, the ACLU filed 
Amnesty v. McConnell in U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York on behalf of human rights organizations,26 
an international labor union,27 journalists,28 and defense 
attorneys,29 all of whom allegedly rely on the ability to engage 
in confidential communications with individuals abroad in 
fulfillment of their professional obligations.30  The defendants 
to this suit are the Director of National Intelligence,31 the 
director of the National Security Agency,32 and the Attorney 
General of the United States.33  The plaintiffs filed a Motion in 
Support of Summary Judgment, the defendants replied with a 
Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment; as of the date of 
this writing, the district court judge has not ruled on the 
motion. 
 26 Amnesty International USA, Global Fund of Women, Global Rights, 
Human Rights Watch, the International Criminal Defence Attorneys 
Association, the Washington Office on Latin America, and PEN American 
Center.  Complaint, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 
10, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/faa_complaint 
_20080710.pdf. 
 27 The international labor union referred to is the Service Employee 
International Union. Id. 
 28 The Nation Magazine sues on behalf of itself and its contributing 
journalists Naomi Klein and Chris Hedges. Id. §§ 80, at 29. 
 29 Attorneys Daniel N. Arshack, David Nevin, Scott McKay, Sylvia 
Royce. Complaint, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 
2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/faa_complaint_2008 
0710.pdf. 
 30 ACLU Sues over Unconstitutional Dragnet Wiretapping Law, STATES 
NEWS SERVICE, July 10, 2008, available at http://www.aclu-mn.org/home/ 
news/aclusuesoverunconstitution.htm. 
 31 Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008) 
(John M. McConnell, at the time of filing). 
 32 Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander, at the time of filing.  Id. 
 33 Michael B. Mukasey, at the time of filing.   Id. 
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2) The ACLU’s Argument that Section 702 is 
Unconstitutional 
The ACLU argues that the FAA violates the Fourth 
Amendment, the First Amendment,34 and Article III; however, 
for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on the ACLU’s 
Fourth Amendment argument.  The ACLU’s primary concern 
with the new law is that the Act provides a means for the 
government to engage in “dragnet surveillance tactics”35 
because it expressly states that the government is not required 
to identify the facilities, telephone lines, e-mail addresses, 
places, premises, or property at which its surveillance will be 
directed in order to obtain a certified warrant from the FISA 
court.36 
According to the ACLU, the lack of specificity in the 
surveillance warrant resembles “general warrants” that were 
issued by the English government which the Framer’s 
specifically had in mind while drafting the Fourth Amendment 
and purposely meant to exclude because they lead to abuses of 
power by the State.37  The ACLU argues that while the old 
FISA statute “generally foreclosed the government from 
engaging in ‘electronic surveillance’ without first obtaining an 
individualized and particularized order from the FISC,”38 
under the new amendment: 
 
[T]he government may obtain a mass acquisition order 
without identifying the people (or even the group of people) 
to be surveilled; without specifying the facilities, places, 
premises, or property to be monitored; without specifying the 
particular communications to be collected; without obtaining 
 34 The ACLU argues that the FAA violates the First Amendment 
“because it sweeps within its ambit constitutionally protected speech that the 
government has no legitimate interest in acquiring and because it fails to 
provide adequate procedural safeguards.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 
6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/ 
amnesty_v_mcconnell_memosupportingsummaryjudgement.pdf. 
 35 Id. at 1, 17, 21, 28, 41. 
 36 Id. at 9 (referring to §702(g)(4)). 
 37 Id. at 26. 
 38 Complaint at 9, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed July 10, 2008) (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(2006)). 
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individualized warrants based on criminal or foreign 
intelligence probable cause; and without making even a prior 
administrative determination that the acquisition relates to 
a particular foreign agent or foreign power.  A single mass 
acquisition order may be used to justify the surveillance of 
communications implicating thousands or even millions of 
U.S. citizens and residents.39 
The ACLU argues that through the use of mass acquisition 
orders issued by the FISA Court, the interception of 
communications by the executive branch violates both the 
Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment and the 
requirement of reasonableness.  The ALCU argues that the 
Warrant Clause is violated because the FISC issues warrants 
without requiring the government to define either the location 
or the persons who will subject to surveillance.  Second, the 
ACLU argues that even if the FAA surveillance practices do 
not violate the Warrant Clause, the FAA allows the 
government to engage in dragnet wiretapping tactics, which 
the Supreme Court has deemed to be unconstitutional on 
numerous occasions. 
The ACLU also objects that the FAA does not explicitly 
state the minimization procedures that the government is 
bound to adopt under the statute, nor does it provide for 
adequate judicial oversight over the minimization procedures 
to be implemented by the executive branch.  As a result of the 
FAA’s failure to “place meaningful limits on the government’s 
retention analysis, and dissemination of information that 
relates to U.S. citizens,” large government databases can be 
 39 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 9, Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008).  The 
ACLU warns that the FAA creates the potential for the executive branch to 
intercept: “All telephone and e-mail communications to and from countries of 
foreign policy interest for example, Russia, Venezuela, or Israel – including 
communications made to and from U.S. citizens and residents. All telephone 
and e-mail communications to and from the leaders of the Pakistani lawyers’ 
movement for democracy, with the specific purpose of learning whether those 
leaders are sharing information with American journalists and, if so, what 
information is being shared and with which journalists. All of the 
communications of European attorneys who work with American attorneys 
on behalf of prisoners held at Guantánamo, including communications in 
which the two sets of attorneys share information about their clients and 
strategize about litigation.” Id. at 1-2. 
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created through the mass acquisition of international 
communications, and in the future those databases can be 
searched in order to find information about specific U.S. 
persons. 40 
3) The Government’s Response in Defense of Section 702 
The government’s first argument is that the plaintiff lacks 
standing to file this suit; 41 for the purposes of this paper, 
however, I will assume that standing is proper and discuss the 
government’s substantive arguments.  The government argues 
that the FAA does not violate the Fourth Amendment because 
the surveillance authorized under the statute targets foreign 
persons who are located abroad, people who do not enjoy 
constitutional rights and protections.42  The government urges 
the Court to assume that the surveillance agencies act in 
accordance with the targeting procedures specified in the FAA 
and do not engage in any type of reverse targeting of U.S. 
persons.  The Government goes on to argue that when the 
communications of U.S. persons are collected incidental to 
surveillance targeted at foreign powers, a foreign intelligence 
exception to the Warrant Clause applies.43 
The Government admits that because privacy interests of 
U.S. persons are implicated, the FAA must comply with the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, as the 
“underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that 
searches and seizures be reasonable.”44  The government 
argues that the FAA is reasonable because it provides the 
government with information regarding foreign threats to 
national security while protecting the privacy interests of U.S. 
persons who communicate with foreigners located abroad by 
requiring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to review 
all certifications for governmental compliance to the targeting 
 40 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 39, at 20. 
          41 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 17, 
Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file531_37629.pdf. 
 42 Id. at 34. 
 43 Id. at 40. 
 44 Id. at 33.  
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procedures and minimization procedures laid out in FAA.45  
The Government argues that requiring a warrant to be based 
on “individualized suspicion,” which requires “identification of 
the persons, facilities, and communications to be surveilled,”46 
would place an unreasonable burden on intelligence gathering 
agencies and “impose a back-door warrant requirement” to 
international surveillance that is not necessary when the 
targets of surveillance are foreign powers located abroad.47  
The government asserts that any constitutionally protected 
privacy interests that the plaintiffs have in their 
communications are adequately protected ex post through 
minimization 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONTEXT, KEITH, 
AND THE FAA 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.49 
The framers of the Constitution were familiar with the 
horrible invasion of privacy that the English “general 
warrants” allowed, and they wished to prevent a similar abuse 
of power by the United States government when they ratified 
the Fourth Amendment.50  At first, the Supreme Court 
required an actual trespass in order to establish that one’s 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful search 
and seizure.51  In time, however, in order to keep pace with 
 45 Id. at 48-49. 
 46 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 53, 
Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available 
at http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file531_37629.pdf. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 39. 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50 William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National 
Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000). 
 51 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
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modern technology, the Supreme Court extended Fourth 
Amendment protection to electronic surveillance in Katz v. 
United States.52  While Katz is the seminal United States case 
discussing personal privacy rights in communications, like 
most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it focuses on an 
American individual’s privacy rights in a criminal investigation 
rather than in the national security context.  Because the 
“requirements for obtaining surveillance authority for the two 
threats are fundamentally distinct . . . [t]he Fourth 
Amendment cannot, and does not, provide even-handed 
guidance”53 for assessing the constitutionality of a surveillance 
program such as the FAA. 
A) Keith and National Security 
The only Supreme Court case that deals with an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment rights in a national security 
matter is United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith).54  In Keith, 
the Supreme Court addressed whether the Fourth Amendment 
required a neutral magistrate to issue a warrant prior to the 
executive branch commencing domestic surveillance for the 
purposes of national security.55  According to the Court, “[t]he 
determination of this question requires the essential Fourth 
Amendment inquiry into the ‘reasonableness’ of the search and 
seizure in question, and the way in which that ‘reasonableness’ 
derives content and meaning through reference to the Warrant 
Clause.”56  Recognizing that “the Fourth Amendment is not 
absolute in its terms,” the Supreme Court balanced “the duty of 
the Government to protect the domestic security, and the 
potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to 
individual privacy and free expression.”57  The Supreme Court 
 52 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  The Katz decision 
“implicitly recognized that the broad and unsuspected governmental 
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails 
necessitate the application of Fourth Amendment safeguards.” United States 
v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith) 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 53 Banks & Bowman, supra note 50, at 9. 
 54 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
 55 Id. at 309. 
 56 Id. at 309-10 (emphasis added). 
 57 Id. at 314-15 (emphasis added). 
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reasoned that “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly 
be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be 
conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch.  
The Fourth Amendment does not contemplate that the 
executive officers of Government will act as neutral and 
disinterested magistrates.”58  Therefore, the Supreme Court 
declined to create a national security exception to the warrant 
requirement59 and held that, in the case of domestic 
surveillance, even if surveillance is conducted in the interests 
of national security, prior judicial review was required in order 
for electronic surveillance to comport with the constitutional 
requirements under the Fourth Amendment.60  The Supreme 
Court also made clear that the Keith decision pertained only to 
domestic surveillance programs, and did not address the 
question of whether the President has authority to conduct 
warrantless surveillance of foreign powers.61 
B) Surveillance Must Always Comport with the 
Reasonableness Requirement 
In Keith, the Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that 
the requirements to obtain a warrant could be different in the 
national security context,62 as the “exact targets of such 
surveillance may be more difficult to identify than in 
surveillance operations against many types of crime,”63 yet 
regardless of whether the purpose of surveillance is for 
criminal investigation or to collect intelligence information, the 
use of electronic surveillance by the government always risks 
infringing on “constitutionally protected privacy of speech.”64  
Therefore, the test of whether electronic surveillance conducted 
in the interests of national security comports with the 
 58 Id. at 316-17 (emphasis added). 
 59 Id. at 320. 
 60 Keith, 407 U.S. at 324. 
 61 Id. at 321-22 (stating: “[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects 
of national security.  We have not addressed, and expressed no opinion as to, 
the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of foreign powers 
of their agents.”).  
 62 Id. at 322-23. 
 63 Id. at 322. 
 64 Id. at 320. 
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requirements of the Fourth Amendment is whether the 
surveillance is “reasonable both in relation to the legitimate 
need of Government for intelligence information and the 
protected rights of our citizens.”65   
Later decisions by the Supreme Court assessing the 
reasonableness of searches not based on suspicion have upheld 
statutes and regulations that invaded individual privacy where 
there was a legitimate government interest in public safety.  
Recently, in Samson v. California, the Supreme Court upheld a 
California statute that subjected all parolees to agree to be 
subject to a search or seizure without a search warrant and 
without any cause as a condition of their release.66  The 
Supreme Court noted that such invasion of privacy of law-
abiding citizens would not otherwise be tolerated under the 
Fourth Amendment.  In 1995, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a school policy whereby all high school 
students who wished to play sports needed to consent to 
random drug tests not based on suspicion.67  And, in 1989, the 
Supreme Court upheld another random drug and alcohol 
testing case for railroad employees because the search was 
narrow and all employees knew about the regulation.68 
C. While It Is Unclear Whether the FAA Violates the Warrant 
Clause, the FAA Violates the Reasonableness Clause of the 
Fourth Amendment 
A full discussion on whether the FAA violates the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment is outside the scope of this 
note.  However, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
acknowledgement that Congress has the authority to relax the 
traditional warrant requirements in the case of surveillance 
conducted to protect national security, one can fairly assume 
that a court will be reluctant to declare the FAA as 
unconstitutional under the Warrant Clause.  In Keith, the 
government conducted domestic surveillance without a warrant 
or any prior judicial approval, and this was unconstitutional 
 65 Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added). 
 66 547 U.S. 843 (2006). 
 67 Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 68 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
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Chief Justice Earl Warren in mind. 
 
 
according to the court, even though the surveillance was 
conducted for national security purposes.  However, under the 
FAA, the intelligence agencies are required to obtain a warrant 
from the FISC in order to conduct surveillance.  And even in 
the case where emergency surveillance commences without 
prior judicial approval for up to a period of seven days, the 
Keith opinion mentions that this would not constitute a per se 
violation of the Warrant Clause in the national security 
context.  Accordingly, even if a court were to apply the same 
standards as did the Keith Court, the requirement of judicial 
oversight of executive branch surveillance under Keith is 
satisfied.  Therefore, it will be assumed that the FAA does not 
violate the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment, and the 
discussion of this note will concentrate on to the only 
remaining question of whether the FAA, which allows for the 
deviation from the traditional warrant requirement of 
particularity and suspicion, is “reasonable both in relation to 
the legitimate need of Government for intelligence information 
and the protected rights of our citizens.”69 
The government insists that preventing terrorism is the 
State’s most important task; therefore, the FAA is 
reasonable.70  But, this argument is conclusory and fails to 
take into account the constitutionally protected privacy 
interests of citizens, which the Supreme Court has articulated 
must be balanced against the government’s need for 
intelligence information.  Here, a careful analysis of both the 
necessity of surveillance information and privacy rights is 
warranted.  In attempting to assess the proper balance 
between privacy and security, one should keep the words 
This concept of ‘national defense’ cannot be deemed an end 
in itself, justifying any . . .  power designed to promote 
such a goal.  Implicit in the term ‘national defense’ is the 
notion of defending those values and ideas which set this 
Nation apart . . . .  It would indeed be ironic if, in the name 
 69 Keith, 407 U.S. at 322-23. 
 70 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment at 48;  
Amnesty v. McConnell, No. 08 Civ. 6259 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2008), available 
at  http://www.aclu.org/images/nsaspying/asset_upload_file531_37629.pdf. 
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 . . . which [make] the defense of the Nation 
ent surveillance program becomes a fishing 
expe
 
of national defense, we would sanction the subversion of . . 
. those liberties
worthwhile.71 
The government claims that it needs this surveillance data 
in order to protect the United States from terrorist attacks.  
The Supreme Court has recognized that government has a 
legitimate interest in promoting the safety of its citizens, and 
in the name of such safety, individual privacy rights sometimes 
must be compromised.72  However, in each case where the 
Supreme Court has allowed suspicionless searches, the targets 
of such searches were limited to particular group of consenting 
people; in Samson, it was parolees, in Vernonia School Dist., it 
was high school athletes who in the past used drugs heavily; 
and in Skinner, it was railroad employees who were well aware 
that they could be subjected to random drug and alcohol 
screenings as part of their job.  Under the FAA, the 
government is not required to show any specific suspicion of 
wrongdoing, nor is the government required to certify that 
there is reason to believe the targets of surveillance are 
affiliated with terrorism.  As the previous cases demonstrated, 
searches not based on suspicion are not per se unconstitutional, 
but when the scope of the FAA allows for the government to 
conduct a search of all electronic communications between non-
consenting U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons located abroad, 
the governm
dition. 
If the FAA was enacted to help the government monitor 
terrorists’ cells and hopefully prevent future terrorist attacks, 
then the government should be required to certify that its 
primary purpose in conducting the surveillance is to monitor 
the activities of terrorists located abroad, or to collect 
intelligence information that will prevent terrorist attacks on 
U.S. soil.  Without any link between surveillance and 
wrongdoing, the requirement of reasonableness of the Fourth 
Amendment requires that the scope of suspicionless searches 
 71 Keith, 407 U.S. at 332 (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 
(1967) (Warren, J., concurring)). 
 72 See id.; see also Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); Vernonia 
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). 
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urveillance authorized under the FAA is 
unre
e 
priv
 
be limited to a defined group of people, such as those whom the 
government knows to be affiliated with terrorism.  Because the 
FAA does not limit surveillance to those suspected of 
wrongdoing and allows the interception of practically all 
communications between U.S persons and non-U.S. persons 
located abroad, it violates 
irement of reasonableness. 
A contrary result would suggest that when the Supreme 
Court decided Samson, it would have upheld a statute allowing 
the state of California to conduct warrantless and suspicion 
free searches of all its citizens, not just consenting parolees.  
Or, when it decided Vernonia School District and Skinner, the 
Court would uphold policies allowing the state to randomly 
drug test any citizen regardless of consent and regardless of 
any suspicion of wrongdoing.  Here, the FAA allows the 
government to intrude into the private conversations of all U.S. 
persons who speak to non-U.S. persons abroad, who have not 
consented to such searches.  Because the scope of such searches 
is overly broad, and is not based on any connection to 
wrongdoing, s
asonable. 
The government insists that even if the privacy rights of 
Americans are violated incidentally through its surveillance 
program, the minimization procedures provide an adequate 
remedy for such interference.  However, the specific 
minimization procedures used by the government are classified 
as confidential,73 so the people have essentially no way of 
knowing if their conversations are being intercepted, overheard 
and stored by the federal government.74  To make matters 
worse, there is no judicial oversight into the specific 
minimization procedures that the intelligence agencies adopt 
pursuant to each warrant, and so the government quite 
possibly could create huge call databases, which could store th
ate conversations of Americans for years into the future. 
Even though the Supreme Court has confronted many 
Fourth Amendment cases, none have specifically addressed the 
question that is posed in Amnesty v. McConnell: is the mass 
 73 In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 728 n.16 (2002). 
 74 Hentoff, supra note 4. 
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s versus a nation’s 
need to protect its citizens from terrorism. 
 
acquisition of communications data, which indirectly implicates 
U.S. persons’ privacy rights, reasonable in relation to the end 
goal of preventing terrorism, regardless of whether a warrant 
is required in order to conduct surveillance targeted at foreign 
agents?  In light of the lack of case law governing this issue,75 I 
think it is helpful to take a step back and assess the current 
international standards governing communications 
surveillance in order to gain insight into how other nations 
have balanced the privacy rights of citizen
 75 On January 12, 2009, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
released an opinion, dated August 22, 2008, where the court affirmed that 
surveillance conducted in accordance with the Protect America Act of 2007 
(PAA), the predecessor to FAA, does not violate either the Warrant Clause of 
the Fourth Amendment or the requirement that all searches be reasonable.  
The PAA, similar to the FAA, allowed the government to conduct surveillance 
of foreign agents without requiring the target of surveillance to be specified.  
In assessing the constitutionality of PAA, the FISC boldly stated that there is 
a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement, although the 
Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has never explicitly declared 
that there was one.  After having resolved the Warrant Clause issue, the 
Court admitted that the government’s surveillance practices must comport 
with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement.  Accordingly, the 
Court looked to the “totality of the circumstances” to determine the degree of 
intrusion into privacy the Constitution will allow.  In attempting to construe 
the “totality of the circumstances” the Court started its analysis by declaring 
that “the interest in national security – is of the highest order of magnitude.”  
To support this assertion, the Court cited a Supreme Court case which 
upheld a decision by the Secretary of State to revoke a citizen’s passport on 
the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are causing or are 
likely to cause serious damage to the national security or foreign policy of the 
United States.  It is beyond my understanding how dicta from this case, 
which involves one American who is suspected of wrongdoing, has any 
relevance in upholding the constitutionality of legislation which permits the 
surveillance of thousands or even millions of Americans.  The infringement 
on personal liberty based on the suspected wrongdoing of a specific individual 
is very different than infringing on the privacy rights of all U.S. persons who 
communicate to non-U.S. persons located abroad.  Since the Supreme Court 
has never analyzed the issue directly, nor has pronounced a foreign 
intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause, it is unclear whether they 
would agree with the reasoning of the FISC’s latest decision.  In re Sealed 
Case, No. 08-01 (FISA Ct. Rev. Aug. 22, 2008). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING GOVERNMENTAL 
SURVEILLANCE OF COMMUNICATION 
A. Sources of International Law: Treaties and Custom 
International law stems from a number of sources.  The 
first step to resolving any international law question starts 
with consulting relevant treaties or binding resolutions.76  In 
the event that such documents are not directly on point to the 
issue, one should next consider the role of international 
custom.77  Lastly, judicial decisions may be consulted, because 
while they are not a direct source of international law, they can 
be helpful because such decisions reflect customary 
international law.78 
The right to privacy is a well-recognized, “fundamental, 
though not absolute, human right.”79  Numerous international 
treaties establish that citizens are entitled a right to privacy in 
their communications.  Beginning with Article 12 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which has 
been coined as “the modern privacy benchmark at an 
international level,”80 there is language which states that “[n]o 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his . . . 
correspondence . . . .  Everyone has the right to the protection 
of the law against such interference or attacks.”81  In addition, 
Article 12 of the American Convention on Human Rights and 
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) incorporate similar language.  According to 
Professor Charles H.B. Garraway, the key word is “arbitrary,” 
meaning that “[t]argeted interference with the right to privacy 
in accordance with domestic law would not seem to run afoul of 
 76 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 26 (2003). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. at 37. 
 79 David Banisar & Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: 
An International Survey of Privacy, Data Protection, and Surveillance Laws 
and Developments, 18 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 8 (1999); see 
also Charles H.B. Garraway, State Intelligence Gathering: Conflict of Laws, 
28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 575, 579 (2007). 
 80 Banisar & Davies, supra note 79, at 8. 
 81 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.217A, at 12, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
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 the 
State. 
: Balancing between Individual 
Privacy and
 
the human rights provision . . . although the targeting will 
need to be carefully designated so that it does not violate the 
prohibition against discrimination.”82 
The United States is not a signatory of the UDHR, nor did 
it ratify the American Convention on Human Rights.  And 
while the United States finally did ratify the ICCPR in 1992, it 
did so with an express declaration that “the provisions of 
Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing,”83 
and went on to state that the declaration was meant to “clarify 
that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in 
U.S. Courts.”84  Therefore, none of these provisions can be used 
to strike down the FAA as a violation of a treaty of the United 
States. 
While it can be said that most nations recognize the right 
of privacy of their citizens, there are no international treaties 
that deal directly with international surveillance standards.85  
Accordingly, we must look to international custom to determine 
whether there is a rule of law that has developed from the 
“general and consistent practice of states.”86  Because virtually 
every nation conducts surveillance and intelligence 
gathering,87 it is difficult to reconcile the individual privacy 
rights guaranteed to citizens who live in a country that ratified 
one of the above international treaties with international 
custom, which has historically tolerated surveillance by
B. Liberty v. United Kingdom
 National Security 
The recent European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
 82 Garraway, supra note 79, at 581. 
 83 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 
1142 (2007). 
 84 Id. 
 85 A. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation of Espionage and 
International Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 595, 597 (2007). 
 86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 
102 (1987). 
 87 Jeffrey H. Smith, State Intelligence Gathering and International Law: 
Keynote Address, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 543, 544 (2007); Glen Sulmasy & John 
Yoo, Counterintuitive: Intelligence Operations and International Law, 28 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 625, 637 (2007). 
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damental Freedoms 
(ECHR).  Article 8 of the ECHR provides: 
r his private and family 
ls, or for the protection of 
s of national 
secu
 
decision, Liberty v. United Kingdom, suggests that 
international custom regarding surveillance is changing, as 
judicial decisions can be helpful in determining customary 
international law.88  The international treaty directly 
implicated by this lawsuit is the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fun
 
(1)  Everyone has the right to respect fo
life, his home and his correspondence. 
(2)  There shall be no interference by a public authority with 
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with 
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of a country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or mora
the rights and freedoms of others.89 
This freedom to communicate without governmental 
interference is protected in the European Union as a human 
right, specifically “Article 8 of the ECHR establishes privacy in 
one’s communications as a qualified, fundamental right.”90  
Although the European Court of Human Rights has interpreted 
Article 8 to strictly prohibit the arbitrary interception of 
international surveillance data, in the interest
rity, Article 8's protections are not absolute.  
During the 1990’s the United Kingdom’s Ministry of 
Defense operated an Electronic Test Facility that was capable 
of intercepting 10,000 simultaneous telephone calls, e-mails 
and faxes from Dublin to London and on to Continental 
Europe.91 The United Kingdom’s surveillance law at the time 
was The Interception of Communications Act 1985 (ICA),92 
which allowed for the interception of communications pursuant 
to a warrant.  The warrants only allowed the government to 
 88 CASSESE, supra note 76, at 37. 
 89 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230. 
 90 Alexander Diaz Morgan, A Broadened View of Privacy as a Check 
Against Government Access to E-Mail in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, 40 NYU J. INT’L L. & POL. 803, 817 (2008). 
 91 Liberty v. United Kingdom, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 58243/00, 2. 
 92 The Interception of Communications Act 1985, c. 56 § 1, (Eng.). 
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ternal communications was . . . virtually 
unfe
 
physically intercept communications, not read them or listen to 
them.  The “warrants covered very broad classes of 
communications, for example, ‘all commercial submarine cables 
having one terminal in the UK and carrying external 
communications to Europe’, and all communications falling 
within the specified category would be physically 
intercepted.”93  While it was necessary for the UK Government 
to obtain a warrant in order to intercept communications, 
“[t]he legal discretion granted to the executive for the physical 
capture of ex
ttered.”94 
After obtaining the warrant, the Secretary of State was 
required to issue a certificate describing the classes of 
communications that could be “extracted from the total volume 
of communications intercepted under a particular warrant.”95  
The certificates did not need to specify the targets of 
surveillance, but rather just label the categories as either 
relating to “national security,” “preventing or detecting serious 
crime,” or “safeguarding the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom.”96  “National security” meant any activities “which 
threaten the safety or well-being of the State, and which are 
intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy 
by political, industrial or violent means.”97  In determining 
whether a warrant should be issued for such surveillance, the 
ICA required the Secretary of State to find that a warrant was 
necessary because the information could not reasonably be 
acquired through other investigative methods.98  These two 
steps formed a “certified warrant.”99  After the “certified 
warrant” was issued, the judiciary’s role in the process ended, 
and it was up to the state officials to come up with keyword 
search terms so that an automated search engine could filter 
the intelligence data collected.100  The ICA required the 
 93 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. 58243/00, 12. 
 94 Id. at 18. 
 95 Id. at 12. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5 (citing 1986 Report of the 
Commissioner).  
 98 The Interception of Communications Act 1985, c. 56 § 2(3) (Eng.). 
 99 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R.at 12. 
 100 Id. 
  
2010] MONITORING INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS 23 
 promote the “minimisation 
of th
ding 
appl
 ensure 
that
executive to create rules designed to
e interference with privacy.”101 
Despite the minimization procedures, however, Liberty (a 
British civil liberties’ organization based in London), British 
Irish Rights Watch, and the Irish Council for Civil Liberties 
(both Irish civil liberties’ organizations based in Dublin) 
commenced a lawsuit against the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, claiming that the government 
infringed upon their privacy rights by physically intercepting 
virtually all international communications, inclu
icant’s privileged and confidential communications.102 
The applicants argued to the Court that the Government’s 
interception of private communications was not proportionate 
to any legitimate aim of protecting national security, since “the 
1895 Act permitted interception of large classes of 
communications for any purpose, and it was only subsequently 
that this material was sifted to determine whether it fell 
within the scope of a [certified] warrant.”103  The Government 
submitted that “in principle, any person who sent or received 
any form of telecommunication outside the British Islands 
during the period in question could have had such a 
communication physically intercepted” under such a 
warrant.104  The Government said that in the interest of 
national security, it could not disclose how it filtered the 
physically intercepted data as “[i]t would enable individuals to 
adapt their conduct so as to minimize the effectiveness of any 
interception methods which it might be thought necessary to 
apply to them.”105  However, the Government urged the Court 
to trust that the Government had safeguards in place to
 communications were not surveilled arbitrarily.106 
The European Court of Human Rights was unconvinced by 
the government’s promise to conduct surveillance in a manner 
 
 101 Id. at 13. 
 102 Id. at 12. Applicants were lawyers who were in regular contact with 
hrough electronic means. 
08 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 13. 
t 14. 
clients abroad and provided legal advice t
 103 Liberty, 20
 104 Id. a
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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, irrespective of 
any 
 be in 
“accordance with the law.”  These safeguards included: 
the offences which may give rise to an 
e categories of people liable to have their 
ollowed for examining, using and 
 be taken when communicating the data 
 
that was “in accordance with the law”107 and held that there 
was an actionable interference by the government’s data 
mining practice.  The ECtHR stated that, “the mere existence 
of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring of 
communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to 
whom the legislation may be applied;”108 therefore, the UK’s 
surveillance program amounted to an “interference with the 
exercise of the applicants’ rights under Article 8
measures actually taken against them.”109 
The ECtHR next stated that the interference in privacy 
was justified because the surveillance was necessary in the 
interest of national security; the only question that remained 
before the Court, therefore, is whether the government’s 
interception of private communications was in “accordance 
with the law.”110  The ECtHR held that in order for an 
international surveillance program be in accordance with the 
law, it is “essential to have clear, detailed rules on interception 
of telephone conversations  . . . [so that it] give[s] citizens an 
adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the 
conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort 
to any such measures.”111  The Court described certain 
“minimum safeguards” that must be explicitly spelled out in 
any international surveillance statute in order to
 
(1) the nature of 
interception order; 
(2) a definition of th
telephones tapped; 
(3) a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; 
(4) the procedure to be f
storing the data obtained; 
(5) the precautions to
to other parties; and 
 107 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 20. 
 108 Id. at 16. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id. at 17. 
 111 Id. at 18. 
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recordings may or must be 
as been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”114 
an Court of Human Rights Would Declare the 
FAA Unlawful 
 conversations are likely to be 
the 
 
(6) the circumstances in which 
erased or the tapes destroyed.112 
The ECtHR described the government’s authority to 
intercept data under the Interception of Communications Act 
1985 as “virtually unfettered,”113 and therefore held that the 
ICA was in violation of Article 8 of the ECHR.  To remedy this 
intrusion into private communications, the Court declared that 
“[e]veryone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a 
national authority notwithstanding that the violation h
C. The Europe
In light of Liberty v. United Kingdom, if one were to 
hypothetically challenge the FAA in the European Court of 
Human Rights, it is unlikely that the Court would uphold the 
FAA as a lawful surveillance program because the scope of 
authority granted to the intelligence agencies to intercept and 
examine private communications is close to limitless.  
Moreover, the law does not clearly state how data mining will 
be conducted in order to prevent abuse of power by the 
executive branch.  In addition, because there is no public 
disclosure about the minimization procedures that the 
intelligence agencies are required to follow, there is no way for 
the public to know whether their
subject of such an invasion.. 
Like the plaintiffs in Amnesty v. McConnell, the plaintiffs 
in the ECtHR lawsuit were civil rights activist organizations 
who claimed that the government infringed upon the privacy 
rights of all citizens through their surveillance program, which 
had the effect of physically intercepting almost all 
international communications.  The plaintiffs claimed, similar 
 112 Liberty, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 18. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 20. It is interesting to note that the remedy created by the 
Court’s holding in Liberty is in direct conflict with the retroactivity immunity 
that the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 grants telecommunication providers. 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 5, § 801. 
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zens was not proportionate to the goal of national 
secu
cedures must comply with certain 
minimum safeguards. 
1) Foreseeability 
mation could not 
reas
to the ACLU, that the government’s intrusion into the privacy 
of all citi
rity. 
Liberty sets out a two-prong test in order to determine 
whether surveillance which interferes with the private 
communications of citizens is in “accordance with the law.”  
Accordingly, surveillance must be foreseeable, meaning that a 
surveillance statute must provide clear, detailed rules about 
surveillance procedures so that it gives citizens an indication 
as to the circumstances in which their conversations will be 
monitored; such pro
The ECtHR struck down the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985, even though surveillance was 
conducted pursuant to a warrant, because the judicially issued 
warrants were so vague and all-encompassing that, in the eyes 
of the ECtHR, they granted too much discretion to intercept 
and dissect private communications.  The ECtHR found that 
the ICA failed to prevent an abuse of power by the state and 
failed to allow citizens the opportunity to know when their 
communications would be subject to a search.  The ICA did not 
require the intelligence agencies to specify the particular 
individuals or places to be targeted, but rather warrants would 
be granted if an executive official certified that such 
surveillance related to national security, and that such 
surveillance was necessary because the infor
onably be acquired through other means. 
Similarly, under the FAA, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court will issue a warrant for surveillance as long 
as the Attorney General and Director of National Intelligence 
certify that a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information.  Other than the requirement 
that officials cannot intentionally target U.S. persons, there is 
no requirement that the surveillance be targeted at any specific 
person or place.  Accordingly, nothing in the FAA prevents the 
government from abusing its power in conducting surveillance 
for purposes other than preventing terrorism.  The executive 
branch is given broad discretion to monitor international 
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nformation is a significant purpose of the 
surv
ce is necessary.  
Perhaps this means that the government can: 
 
re non-U.S. 
ns on notice that their communications 
are 
 
communications, so long as the ascertaining of foreign 
intelligence i
eillance. 
Theoretically, when the two statutes are compared, the 
FAA allows for even more interception of international 
communications, as there is no requirement that the United 
States government certify that such surveillan
[E]ngage in the wholesale collection of Americans’ 
international communications . . . for example, knowingly 
and intentionally collect all communications between the 
New York and London offices of Amnesty International . . . 
Indeed, under the FAA the government can obtain all 
communications between New York and London so long as 
the ostensible targets for this mass acquisition a
persons believed to be in the United Kingdom.115 
By giving the government such broad discretion, there is no 
way for Americans to adjust their behavior so that they are not 
the subject of surveillance, other than perhaps deciding to 
never speak to any non-U.S. person abroad through the use of 
electronic communication equipment.  It is highly unlikely that 
the ECtHR would uphold a surveillance program as expansive 
as the FAA, because the FAA grants the United States federal 
government the authority to intercept, inspect and store all 
international conversations that occur through electronic 
means, without a showing that such surveillance is necessary 
in the interests of national security.  In addition to employing 
dragnet surveillance tactics, a surveillance program similar to 
the FAA would not pass muster in the ECtHR as it does not 
adequately put citize
being monitored. 
The government in the ACLU case urges the Court to 
assume that the Executive Branch will abide by the regulations 
set forth in the FAA in order to comply with its prohibition 
against reverse-targeting and have in place certain 
minimization procedures designed to protect the privacy of U.S. 
persons whose communications are intercepted incidentally.  
 115 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
supra note 39, at 39 (emphasis added). 
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a degree of 
unregulated discretion without judicial oversight. 
2. Minimum 
mmunications with non-U.S. persons 
cann
s and non-U.S. persons; 
the 
When the UK government attempted this “just trust us” 
argument, the ECtHR was unconvinced that such a large 
degree of executive discretion would result in non-arbitrary 
intrusion into communications.  In this vein, and remembering 
what the Keith court said about the nature of the executive 
branch, the court in Amnesty v. McConnell should be very 
hesitant to defer to the executive branch such 
Safeguards 
The FAA fails under the minimum safeguards analysis of 
Liberty as well.  The ECtHR specifically held that any 
surveillance statute must specifically state the “nature of the 
offense” which gives rise to an interception order, however, the 
FAA does not require the government to believe that the target 
of surveillance is related even remotely to criminal or terrorist 
activities.  If the target of the surveillance is an unknown 
foreign agent, who intelligence agencies have no reason to 
believe is engaged in criminal or terrorist activities, what is the 
nature of the “offense” in such a situation?  Surely, U.S. 
persons engaging in co
ot be an “offense.” 
The ECHR would also require a surveillance statute to 
explicitly state the categories of people liable to have their 
telephone lines tapped, which may mean people who 
communicate with known or suspected terrorists.  No such 
showing of suspicion of wrongdoing, however, is required under 
the FAA.  The intelligence agencies can intercept all 
communications between U.S. person
FAA makes no other limitations.   
Under the Liberty guidelines, minimization procedures 
should be explicitly laid out in the statute so that the 
authorities cannot intrude into the private conversations 
among people in a way that is discriminatory or arbitrary.  The 
FAA, however, fails to specify the details of the minimization 
procedures which the intelligence agencies are required to 
adopt.  Lastly, because there are no guidelines on when 
recordings must be erased or destroyed, and there is nothing 
preventing the government from compiling all the intelligence 
data collected under this surveillance program into searchable 
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, the FAA would fail under the Liberty safeguard 
analysis. 
nell, the Court will strike down the FAA as 
unconstitutional. 
 
databases
CONCLUSION 
Because terrorism is a global problem, all nations around 
the world are confronted with having to balance the privacy 
rights of their citizens versus the pressing need of all 
governments to secure the national defense of their country.  In 
assessing the United States’ current surveillance practices, it is 
beneficial to be aware of how other nations have struck the 
balance between individual liberty and national security, as 
that may impact one’s conclusion of whether or not the FAA is 
reasonable.  In the end, however, the question is ultimately one 
of Fourth Amendment constitutional analysis.  Although the 
future of privacy rights in this country is not clear, there is 
good reason to believe that should the Supreme Court hear 
Amnesty v. McCon
 
